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I. INTRODUCTION
The theory underlying cash collateral is less complicated than its
nomenclature or statutory definition implies.' Quite simply, a debtor's
possession, of a type which may be circulated as money, secures a debt to a
creditor.2
By way of the classic example: a lender sells a debtor inventory and takes
back a security interest in that inventory. The debtor sells the inventory for
cash. By operation of law, the security interest then attaches to that cash,3 and
the cash replaces the inventory as collateral for the loan.4
The lender thus acquires a vested interest in the debtor's money. A
security interest is a form of property interest.5 As a result, the debtor assumes
The Bankruptcy Code defines "cash collateral," as "cash, negotiable instruments, documents
of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and
an entity other than the estate have an interest," including "the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or
profits of property and the fees, charges, accounts or other payments for the use of occupancy of rooms and
other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties subject to a security interest as provided
in section 552(b) of this title, whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under this title."
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1999). Section 552(b), referred to by Section 363(a), creates an exception to Section
552(a)'s general rule that property acquired by the debtor or estate after the filing of bankruptcy is free of
any prepetition lien or security interest by permitting "the prepetition security interest to extend to proceeds,
product, offspring or [profits] acquired after commencement of the case, subject to certain exceptions." 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 552.01, at 552-53 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998).
Additionally, according to Section 552(b), "a prepetition security interest may extend to rents generated by
the collateral and to payments for the use and occupancy of rooms in lodging properties, again subject to
certain exceptions." Id.
The term "Bankruptcy Code" refers to Title 11 of the United States Code, as enacted by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and subsequently amended. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 repealed
and replaced the amended Bankruptcy Act of 1898, generally referred to as the "Bankruptcy Act."
2 Although the statutory definition should be relied upon, see 11 U.S.C § 363(a), a likening of
cash to that which "circulates as money" may be found in BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 216 (6th ed. 1990).
3 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1999) ("Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any
identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.")
4 Of course, the secured lender should not be permitted to immediately appropriate these proceeds.
Without benefit of the use of the cash collateral, reorganization may be futile. In accordance with this
example, a debtor without the use of cash collateral could purchase no more inventory, or even, for that
matter, pay its employees. Thus, Section 363 of the Code permits the debtor, under certain circumstances,
the benefit of use of its cash collateral, much as a debtor could still use machinery which was the subject
of a lender's lien.
5 See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979) (including security interests
among property interests); BLACK'S LAW DICnIONARY 1357 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "security interest" as
a "form of interest in property ...."); Stephen A. Stripp, Balancing of Interests in Orders Authorizing the
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the role of a fiduciary for the holder of the security interest-a trustee, of
sorts.
Even in the absence of statute or court order, if one misappropriates
another's property, common law dictates that that party will be held account-
able. If this defalcation flies in the face of statute or in derogation of court
order, more severe consequences may adhere.
But scrutinize the Bankruptcy Code for a statutory remedy for the misuse
of cash collateral, and you will search in vain. In response, courts have been
forced to devise judicially created remedies.
Certainly this issue is not novel.6 Recently, however, the Congressionally-
sponsored National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended an
amendment of the Code to add the unauthorized use of cash collateral as an
explicit ground warranting dismissal of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion, conversion of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding, or the appointment of a trustee to replace a Chapter 11
debtor in possession as caretaker of the bankruptcy estate.7 The authors of this
Article contend that a clear Congressional expression of intent is by far the
superior method of approaching this quandary. Absent such a lucid gesture,
however, courts continue to fashion remedies, and this Article, consequently,
examines their propriety.
II. USE OF CASH COLLATERAL IN BANKRUPTCY
The Bankruptcy Code prohibits the use of cash collateral by a trustee or
debtor in possession8 without either the security holder's consent or permis
Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 562, 565 & n.13 (1991) ("A security
interest is property which is protected by the United States Constitution."); John F. Dolan, The U.C.C.
Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U. L. REV. 811, 811, 821, 823-25
(1979) (finding security interests to be one of the "basic property interests" upon which the Uniform
Commercial Code rests).
6 In fact, published opinions regarding the improper use of cash collateral date nearly date back
to the Code's genesis. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc.), 4 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980).
7 See Report of the Nat'l Bankr. Review Comm'n at 623-24, 650-56 (Oct. 20, 1997)
(Recommendation 2.5.9). As a default, the Chapter II debtor is permitted to operate the bankrupt entity
by remaining a "debtor in possession." See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1999).
9 Although the Code's text refers to use of cash collateral by a trustee, who may operate a business
for a limited period under Chapter 7, see 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1999), or who may operate a business under
Chapter 11, see 11 U.S.C. § 1108, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession acts in place of a trustee, see 11
U.S.C. § 1107(a), at least unless and until the court appoints a trustee to replace the debtor in operating the
business. See discussion infra Part IV(K). Thus, in a Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor in possession
has statutory authority to pursue an order authorizing the use of cash collateral. Code Section 363 also
applies in Chapter 12 and, with certain limits, in Chapter 13 cases, where a debtor may exercise the Section
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sion of the court.9 In the absence of this authority, cash collateral must be
segregated and accounted for, apart from other estate funds. ° If cash
collateral use is subject to conditions or limitations, sums which are not to be
used must be segregated.'
To effect authorization by the security holder's consent, all parties
affected must affirmatively acquiesce after becoming aware of the present or
impending bankruptcy.' Implied consent is generally insufficient. 3
As any agreement between the debtor and a secured creditor regarding the
use of cash collateral will affect other creditors,' 4 any such agreement must be
363 powers, but does not apply in cases under Chapter 9 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 103,901(a) (1999).
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 363.01, at 363-39, 1 363.03, at 363-23 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds.,
15th ed. rev. 1998).
9 It is important to note that the Code draws a distinction between the use of cash collateral in,
and outside, the ordinary course of business. While authorization may be procured by consent where the
proposed use is within the ordinary course of business, see 11 U.S.C. § 363(c), no such provision exists
where the use is outside the ordinary course of business. In that instance, court permission is required. See
11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1999). To achieve authorization by consent, "each entity that has an interest in such
cash collateral" must acquiesce. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A) (1999). Court permission requires proper notice
and a hearing. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(2)(B) (1999).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(4) (1999).
it Id.
12 See Freightliner Market Dev. Corp. v. Silver Wheel Freightliners, 823 F.2d 362, 368 (9th Cir.
1987) ("The purposes underlying § 363(c)(2) & (4) require that a debtor seek affrmative express consent
from all parties involved before using cash collateral."); Weiss v. People Savings Bank (In re Three
Partners, Inc.), 199 B.R. 230, 237 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) ("[T]his Court does not believe that the failure
of a secured creditor to object to the unauthorized use of cash collateral is tantamount to that creditor's
consent to the use of cash collateral."); Hartigan v. Pine Lake Village Apartment, Co. (In re Pine Lake
Village Apartment Co.), 16 B.R. 750, 755-56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The consent to the use of cash
collateral contemplated under Code § 363(c)(2)(A) must, of necessity, be regarded as post-petition
consent.").
As with any contract, a written agreement expressing consent to the debtor's use of cash
collateral is preferable, see LUDWIG MANDEL, THE PREPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 2-3 (7th
ed. 1978) ("[E]ven when the contract is not required to be in writing, the advantages of reducing it to
writing are many. A writing constitutes a ready reference for settling honest disputes as to what the parties
intended when they made their agreement. In the event of a lawsuit, it is 'the best and most reliable, and
most convincing form of testimony you can offer....' The very fact that the contract is in writing lessens the
likelihood of a breach"), and the creditor should include a provision in this contract providing it with
additional protection in exchange for its consent. See Stripp, supra note 5, at 566-67 ("Adequate protection
of a security interest in cash collateral... ensures just compensation for the loss of the secured creditor's
right to use cash collateral to repay debt").
13 See Freightliner Market Dev. Corp., 823 F.2d at 368-69 ("(W]e find implied consent to be
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 363(c)(2)").
14 As is expected, available assets in bankruptcy tend to be insufficient to satisfy all debt
obligations. Increasing the allocation of limited resources to one creditor results in a concomitant reduction
in the amount of assets available to satisfy the other creditors. See Stripp, supra note 5, at 573.
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approved by the court upon a Rule 4001(d) motion.' An unapproved
agreement may be later invalidated.' 6  Alternatively, a debtor may seek
permission to use cash collateral from the bankruptcy court by Rule 4001(b)
motion. 7 Debtors do not maintain a unitary entitlement to seek orders
1S See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d) (1999). This motion and a copy of the underlying agreement
must be served upon the official committee of unsecured creditors (or any other official committee), if one
exists, or, in a Chapter I 1 reorganization, upon the twenty largest creditors if a creditors' committee does
not exist or has not yet been formed. A creditors' committee may be elected in Chapter 7 pursuant to Code
Section 705, or appointed under Chapter I 1 pursuant to Section 1102. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d)(l)
(1999). Unless the court orders otherwise, interested parties are provided fifteen days from the notice's
mailing to file an objection. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d)(2) (1999). Even in the absence of objection,
the court may nevertheless conduct a hearing, or even approve or disapprove the agreement without a
hearing. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(d)(3) (1999). As cash collateral agreements often (inappropriately)
grant protections beyond Section 361's adequate protection requirement, see Stripp, supra note 5, at 574,
the court has an obligation to review them. See id. at 596 ("The bankruptcy court has the right and the
obligation to see to it that no party to a bankruptcy case takes unfair advantage of other parties.... Thus,
if the court determines that a consensual cash collateral order contains provisions that are inappropriate....
the court may either decline to enter the order or make such modifications as justice requires."). Finally,
motions relating to cash collateral must be served on the Ufiited States Trustee. See FED. R. BANKR. P.
9034(0(1999). Although federal judicial districts within Alabama and North Carolina employ the services
of a Bankruptcy Administrator in lieu of a United States Trustee, this Article, for the sake of simplicity,
merely refers to the United States Trustee. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9035 (1999). In cases within those two
states, the Bankruptcy Administrator functions, and must be served, as would the United States Trustee.
16 See 9 COLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 4001.07[1], at 4001-28 (Lawrence P. King et. al. eds., 15th
ed. rev. 1996) (citing In re Cross Baking Co., 818 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1987)).
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B) (1999); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(b) (1999). As with Rule 4001(d)
motions, a Rule 4001(b) motion must be served upon any creditors' committee or on the twenty largest
unsecured creditors, see discussion supra note 15, and upon any entity holding a security interest in the
cash collateral, as well as upon the United States Trustee. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9034(f) (1999);
discussion supra note 15. This motion engenders a contested matter under Bankruptcy Rule 9014, see FED.
R. BANKR. P. 4001(bXl) (1999), and the court is to hold a final hearing on the merits no sooner than fifteen
days after service. A movant may request a preliminary hearing if use of the cash collateral is required in
less than fifteen days. See I 1 U.S.C. § 363(c)(3) (1999); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(b)(2) (1999) (requiring
a minimum of fifteen days between service of the cash collateral motion and the final hearing on the
merits). An emergency motion to use cash collateral may be filed concurrently with a petition requesting
a preliminary hearing. Upon preliminary hearing, the court may authorize the use of cash collateral only
to the extent "necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate," FED. R. BANKR. P.
4001(b)(2) (1999), and only where "there is a reasonable likelihood that the trustee will prevail at the final
hearing." 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(3) (1999).
While it is the secured party's burden to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, the validity, priority,
and the extent of its security interest, see 11 U.S.C. § 363(o)(2) (1999); In re 523 East Fifth Street Hous.
Preservation Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568, 572 n.2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), the trustee or debtor in
possession has the burden of showing that the secured party is adequately protected. See 11 U.S.C. §
363(o)(1) (1999). There exists a split in authority as to the standard of proof required to establish adequate
protection. Earlier caselaw held that clear and convincing evidence was required. See In re O.P. Held, Inc.,
74 B.R. 777, 784 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Leavell (In re Leavell), 56 B.R. 11, 13
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1985); In re Sheehan, 38 B.R. 859, 868 (D.S.D. 1984). More recently, courts have
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regulating the use of cash collateral. In order to adequately protect their
interests, security holders may also seek to obtain an order prohibiting or
conditioning the use of cash collateral. 8
III. MISUSE OF CASH COLLATERAL
There are a number of manners in which cash collateral may be misused:
(1) use in the absence of authorization; (2) use outside the scope of authoriza-
tion; (3) use other than to benefit the bankruptcy estate; and (4) failure to
segregate and account for cash collateral not authorized for use.
First, if cash collateral is used without either creditor consent or court
authorization, such use violates the requirements of Code Section 363(c)(2),
and is cash collateral misuse. Second, cash collateral may only be used to the
extent, and in accordance with the terms, authorized in the consent agreement
or by the court order. Any deviation from the stipulation or order's scope
amounts to cash collateral misuse. Third, use which is "unrelated to the
operation, care, preservation[,] and maintenance" of the bankruptcy estate
amounts to misuse of cash collateral.' 9 Finally, cash collateral not authorized
required proof by preponderance of the evidence. See In re Ernst Home Center, Inc., 209 B.R. 955, 965
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1997); In re Glasstream Boats, Inc., 110 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990);
McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Texas Savings Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R.
261, 267-68 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
is See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1999); discussion infra Part IV(L). This motion is governed by
Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a), results in a Rule 9014 contested matter, and requires service as would any other
cash collateral motion. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(1) (1999); discussion supra notes 15-17. Again
the Court may grant relief with or without a hearing, see 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1999), or may grant exparte
relief under exigent circumstances. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(2) (1999) (explaining the requirements
for, and the procedure to obtain, exparte relief).
A nonexclusive list of methods of providing adequate protection may be found in Code Section
361. As a security interest is a property right protected under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, see sources supra note 5, the Bankruptcy Code's adequate protection requirement ensures that
a court's cash collateral order does not amount to an unconstitutional "taking" of a creditor's secured
interest. See Stripp, supra note 5, at 565-69.
19 Chaussee v. Morning Star Ranch Resorts Co. (In re Morning Star Ranch Resorts), 64 B.R. 818,
822 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Plaza Family Partnership (In re Plaza Family
Partnership), 95 B.R. 166, 172-74 (E.D. Cal. 1989) ("[lt is evident that cash collateral can be used by the
debtor under section 363 only for a business purpose.... Even in situations where adequate protections are
available cash collateral can not be used for a nonbusiness purpose."); see also Walter v. Sunwest Bank (In
re Walter), 83 B.R. 14, 18-20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (estate property generally); Ranch Partners, Ltd. v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Ranch Partners, Ltd.), 146 B.R. 833, 835-36 (D. Colo. 1992) (payment of
bankruptcy legal fees from cash collateral is a misuse); cf In re Triplett, 87 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1988) ("In cases where the debtor clearly demonstrates that the value of collateral adequately protects the
interests of the secured creditor,.., cash collateral... may be used by the debtor for the general benefit of the
estate
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for use must be segregated from other estate funds and from exploitable cash
collateral.2" If funds are not properly segregated, this may be considered a
passive misuse of cash collateral.2 '
IV. REMEDIES FOR MISUSE
Despite the Code's proscription of cash collateral misuse, no explicit
statutory remedy presently exists.22 In the absence of statutory remedy, courts
have fashioned a palette of remedies from which creditors may choose. The
remedies are diverse; each is appropriate under particular circumstances and
each varies in its severity.23
Courts have long derived authority to remedy cash collateral violations
and sanction violators from Section 105(a) of the Code, which states that
courts "may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of' the Bankruptcy Code.24 Respond-
ing to a debtor's argument that the Code does not allow for a remedy for cash
collateral violations, one judge concluded early on that nothing short of
"anarchy" would result if "a valid lien of a creditor is recognized by the Court
but both the Court and the creditor are powerless to preserve and protect that
lien after bankruptcy has been initiated. '25 Finding that such "cannot be the
result intended by Congress," the court interpreted Section 105(a) "as giving
to the Court the power and the duty to do those things which are reasonably
20 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(4) (1999).
21 See In re Placid Oil Co., 102 B.R. 538, 544 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
u2 In contrast, other Code sections, such as Section 362, provide remedies for violations of those
sections. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1999) (providing for actual, and even punitive, damages for willful
violation of the automatic stay).
Z3 As the consequences of implementing each remedy will vary with the facts of each case, an
objective "ranking" of these remedies according to their severity is impossible. However, the authors have
attempted to list these forms of relief, at least to the extent possible, in ascending order, from the most lax
to most harsh.
24 Courts do not need to be prompted by interested parties to exercise this power. Section 105(a)
continues:
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse
of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1999).
2 Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Aerosmith Denton Corp. (In re Aerosmith Denton Corp.),
36 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983). The court concluded that the debtor had violated the cash
collateral provisions of Section 363 through its use of proceeds from accounts receivable in which the bank
had a security interest. See id. While citing Section 363(c)(1), the Aerosmith court presumably intended
to invoke Section 363(c)(2) as the provision requiring consent or court permission preceding use of cash
collateral. See id.
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required to protect the Court's jurisdiction and to carry out the intent of" the
Code.26
Despite this broad interpretation of Section 105(a), there are limits to this
power. A court may not run amuck in exercising its Section 105(a)
authority,27 and should not invent an atypical form of relief, but should instead
"borrow" one from another Code provision, such as those provided to rectify
Section 362 violations.28
Ideally, a court faced with cash collateral misuse should decide what
purpose the institution of a remedy will serve. Only then should the court
choose an appropriate solution to effect these goals.
As with other areas of the law, the provision of a remedy may serve a
utilitarian or a retributive function. However, the propriety of a bankruptcy
court's implementation of a remedy to serve a retributive function is suspect.
Generally, as a civil court sitting in equity,29 a bankruptcy court's action
should not be punitive.30 Instead, it should limit itself to coercing debtors
against future violation.3
The appropriateness of redress should therefore be contemplated from a
utilitarian perspective. This encompasses two functions: remedial and
prophylactic action. While remedial relief aims to restore the creditor's pre-
violation condition, such as by the provision of adequate protection,32 a court
2 Id. Based on this reasoning, the court granted the secured creditor a replacement ien against
the debtor's post-petition accounts receivable, supplemented, as necessary, by an administrative priority
claim. Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1999); see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01[2], at 105-6.1 to 7
(Lawrence P. King, et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998) ("[lit should be universally recognized that the power
granted to bankruptcy courts under section 105 is not boundless and should not be employed as a panacea
for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy case").
2 A remedy should be tied to another section of the Bankruptcy Code and is in the discretion of
the bankruptcy court. 2 COLIUER ON BANKRuPTCY 1105.01[2], at 105-6.1 to 7 (Lawrence P. King, et al.
eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998); Aerosmith Denton, 36 B.R. at 119.
29 See generally Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) ("[C]ourts of bankruptcy are
essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.").
30 See In re Torres, 117 B.R. 379, 382 (Bankr. N.D. IMl. 1990); William J. Woodward, New
Judgment Liens on Personal Property: Does "Efficient" Mean "Better"?, 27 HARV. J. ON LGIS. 1, 42-43
(Winter 1990); see also Part IV(]) of this Article.
31 See Part (IV)(H) of this Article. This is not to imply that a bankruptcy court may never assess
punitive damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1999); In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 336-38 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) (creditor's "willful and intentional flouting of the Bankruptcy Code" warranted punitive
damages).
32 Where a violation has already occurred, the provision of adequate protection is actually
retroactive adequate protection. In addition to granting adequate protection to a creditor when a debtor
seeks to use cash collateral, adequate protection, when used in these remedies, can be retroactively granted.
See In re Rankin, 49 B.R. 565,570 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985); Aerosmith Denton, 36 B.R. at 119. Section
361 of the Bankruptcy Code provides three methods which the bankruptcy court can use to give the secured
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may institute prophylactic measures to dissuade the debtor,33 or even to
discourage other debtors,34 from prospective misuse of cash collateral.
A. Replacement Lien
One form of curative relief is a court's provision of a replacement lien35
on other unencumbered property of the estate36 to the extent that a debtor's use
of cash collateral decreases the value of the creditor's original security
interest.37 Although this may provide the creditor with a measure of
restitution, its effectiveness is limited. A court's grant of a replacement lien
provides little deterrent for further misuse of cash collateral, but instead
merely replaces that which was wrongfully appropriated. Furthermore, a
creditor adequate protection: cash payments, additional or replacement liens, and other relief that will
"result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such
property." 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1999). The term "indubitable equivalent" is a term of art.
These methods are not meant to be exclusive or exhaustive. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 339
(1977). The trustee, debtor in possession, or creditor will generally propose the means by which protection
is provided, and the court will determine if it is adequate. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 49 (1978). The court also
has the obligation to determine if an agreement for adequate protection and the use of cash collateral is
harniful to other creditors and the estate. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The Honorable Steven
A. Stripp performs a thorough analysis of cash collateral agreement provisions that courts should carefully
scrutinize. See Stripp, supra note 5, at 574-83.
33 See Part (IV)(E) and (H)-(L) of this Article.
34 See Part (IV)(F)-(/) and (M)-(R).
35 See 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1999); Casbeer v. State Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Lubback (In re
Casbeer), 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1986); Carey v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Carey), 202
B.R. 796 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996) (Chapter 13); In re Placid Oil Co., 80 B.R. 824 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987);
Aerosmith Denton, 36 B.R. at 116. Hut see Cargocaire Engineering Corp. v. Dwyer (In re Gemel Int'l,
Inc.), 190 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (quoting In re J.L. Graphics, Inc., 62 B.R. 750 (Bankr.
D.N.H.1986)).
3 Through the operation of Code Section 552(a), property acquired by a debtor post-petition is
generally not subject to liens arising from after-acquired property clauses in security agreements. Therefore,
debtors in bankruptcy may have unencumbered assets despite their financial situation. This is not absolute,
however, as there are broad exceptions to the general rule. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1999). Generally,
Section 552(a) does not act to cut off the secured creditor's interest in "proceeds, product, offspring, or
profits" of property in which it has a security interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1999). Certain rents also
remain subject to security agreements entered into pre-petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1999).
37 See Stripp, supra note 5, at 575-76. A cash collateral agreement which purports to grant a
replacement lien on post-petition assets to secure a pre-petition debt has been held to be an impermissible
means of obtaining post-petition financing. See Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc. (In re Saybrook Mfg.
Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1494-96 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Otte v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp.
(In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979) (disapproving of, but not reaching the issue on, cross-
collateralization). This type of armngement, known as cross-collateralization, should only be disapproved
where the creditor's secured position is increased as a result of the new lien.
38 See Aerosmith Denton, 36 B.R. at 116.
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replacement lien is effective only where a debtor possesses unencumbered
assets to which the lien may attach.
A court should consider whether the grant of a replacement lien will
engender unfairness toward other creditors. In this respect, a replacement lien
is proper only where a debtor has a reasonable probability of completing a
successful reorganization. In the absence of a successful reorganization, less
property will be available, upon liquidation, for distribution to unsecured
creditors. The debtor's misappropriation of one creditor's property does not
justify redistribution of further assets to the detriment of other creditors.
Finally, as the creditor's lien on the debtor's cash collateral has been
destroyed through misuse, the argument may be made that the creditor is no
longer secured and should seek other remedies.39
B. Repayment
Another method of restoring a creditor's position through the provision
of adequate protection is to require a debtor to repay the amount used.' Code
Section 361(1) permits compensation by way of cash payment to remunerate
a creditor for any decrease in the value of cash collateral caused by the
debtor's use.
As with the grant of a replacement lien, however, this remedy is only of
use where unencumbered cash is available, and is not effective in deterring
future violations.
C. Super-Priority Administrative Expense Claim
Generally, Section 361(3) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the award of
an administrative expense claim as adequate protection pursuant to Sections
362, 363, or 364. However, where other adequate protection proves insuffi-
cient, Code Section 507(b)4' allows a court, after notice and hearing and pur-
39 Suggested remedies would be a tort action in the nature of conversion against the officers and
directors responsible for the misuse, including seeking monetary sanctions and punitive damages, where
the debtor is a corporation or partnership, or a Section 523 nondischargeability adversary proceeding where
the debtor is an individual. See Part (IV)(F) and (G) of this Article.
40 See In re Placid Oil Co., 80 B.R. 824 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Etch-Art, Inc., 48 B.R. 143
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1985); Centerre Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Continental Marine Corp. (In re Continental Marine
Corp.), 35 B.R. 990,995 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); see also In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985)
(debtor held in civil contempt after refusing to obey bankruptcy court's order to turn over cash collateral
withdrawn from accounts without creditor consent or court permission).
41 Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
If the trustee, under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate protection of the
interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if, notwithstanding
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suant to Code Section 503(b), to grant an administrative expense claim with
priority over all other administrative expense claims. Therefore, in granting
a super-priority claim to a creditor, a court should first determine previously
ordered adequate protection to be insufficient,42 keeping in mind that rearrang-
ing priorities detrimentally affects unsecured creditors. 3 Furthermore, because
a court's provision of a super-priority claim for the purpose of "retroactively"
establishing adequate protection expressly contravenes Code Section 507(b),
a court may not achieve this result via the Bankruptcy Code's "omnibus pro-
vision,"" Section 105(a).45
In addition, such a grant should require that an actual benefit inure to the
bankruptcy estate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has held, as a condition of a creditor's award of a super-priority expense
claim, that the estate must receive a concrete benefit from a debtor's actual
use of that creditor's property.46 The court, in balancing the equities
underlying the grant of such a claim, explained:
[W]e agree that in many cases "it would be inequitable to tax the
creditor with the burden of the court's error if the judicially deter-
mined adequate protection later proves to be 'inadequate."' However,
it also strikes us as inequitable to tax unsecured creditors for a decline
in the value of collateral when the decline does not result from a use
that actually benefits the estate: '"o prioritize.., claims where they are
not clearly entitled to such treatment, is not only inconsistent with the
policy of equality of distribution but it also dilutes the value of the
such protection, such creditor has a claim allowable under subsection (a)(1) of this section
arising from the stay of action against such property under section 362 of this title, from the use,
sale, or lease of such property under section 363 of this title, or from the granting of a lien under
section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim under such subsection shall have priority
over every other claim under such subsection.
11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1999).
42 Often, cash collateral agreements will include a provision providing for an automatic grant of
a super-priority administrative expense claim to the extent that adequate protection has proven insufficient.
Because of its effect on other creditors, this approach is problematic.
43 See Aerosmith Denton, 36 B.R. at 116. Rearranging priorities detrimentally affects unsecured
creditors because conversion of an unsecured claim to a priority claim reduces the amount of assets
available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
Credit for Section 105's analogy to an "omnibus provision" is due to 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 105.01, at 105-5 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998). A bankruptcy court's
power under Section 105(a) is discussed in notes 24-28, supra, and accompanying text.
45 See Smith v. Dairymen, Inc., (In re Smith) 75 B.R. 365 (W.D. Va. 1987); In re AMT Investment
Corp., 53 B.R. 274 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
4 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1994).
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priority for the claims of creditors Congress in fact intended to
prefer.47
Finally, because a Section 507(b) super-priority administrative expense
claim is appropriate only as a measure of restitution, it should be permitted
only to the extent that the aggrieved creditor has been harmed by the failure
of other adequate protection.
D. Tracing
Where traceable, courts have allowed a creditor's security interest to
follow the disposition of cash collateral by operation of Section 9-306 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' s Tracing requires that the proceeds received from
the use of the collateral are identifiable. 49 To be sure, the usefulness of this
remedy is also limited, as it, too, carries little deterrent value, and, because
funds are easily commingled, tracing the disposition of funds will rarely be
successful.
E. Injunction
As a bankruptcy court may issue an injunction' pursuant to Code Section
105(a)," a secured creditor may seek injunctive relief to halt a debtor's
continuing cash collateral misuse. By way of example, one court enjoined a
debtor "from taking any action to transfer, sell or dispose of cash collateral
which is subject to the plaintiff's interests, pending further order" of that
47 Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 868 (citations omitted) (quoting Cheatham v. Central Carolina Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Cheatham), 91 B.R. 382, 387 (E.D.N.C. 1988) and In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and
Pac. R.R., 658 F.2d 1149, 1163(7th Cir. 1981)); see In re Lovay, 205 B.R. 85,87 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997).
48 See Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d
1430 (4th Cir. 1990); First State Bank of Manchester v. Heims (In re Heims), 65 B.R. 112 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1986).
In fact, under the recent revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the definition
of "proceeds" has been broadened. See George A. Nation, MI, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: The Proposed
Revisions Most Important to Commercial Lenders, 115 BANKING L.J. 212, 223-24 (1998).
49 See Bumper Sales, 907 F.2d at 1439.
50 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4
B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). But see In re Epstein, 26 B.R. 354 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (creditor's
request for an injunction denied because cash collateral was being used for actual and ordinary business
expenses).
51 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRU'rCY 1 105.02 to 105.03[5][b], at 105-8 to 105-57 (Lawrence P.
King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998).
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court.5 2 An injunction may be obtained in bankruptcy by way of adversary
proceeding. 3
The utility of this remedy is predicated on the fact that an injunctive order
provides indisputable notice that further cash collateral misuse will not be
tolerated,' 4 and that unpleasant consequences will adhere upon further breach.
As explained infra, an injunction may be a necessary prerequisite to seeking
a bankruptcy court's contempt order."
F. Exception from Discharge
A secured creditor may seek to have a bankruptcy court declare that its
debt is excepted from a debtor's discharge 56 by adversary proceeding.5 7 To
except a debt from discharge pursuant to Section 523, a creditor must prove
all required elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 8
To have a debt declared nondischargeable on the basis of a debtor's
unauthorized use of cash collateral, the creditor may proceed under a
conversion theory, under certain circumstances. 9 For purposes of bankruptcy,
52 Anchorage Boat Sales, 4 B.R. at 645.
53 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(7) (1999).
54 However, a debtor should, in any event, be on notice that cash collateral misuse is improper
pursuant to statutory provisions and any cash collateral orders or agreements in the bankruptcy case.
55 See Part IV(H) of this Article.
56 See National City Bank of Marion v. Imbody (In re Imbody), 104 B.R. 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1989); In re Beasley, 62 B.R. 653 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Weber,
99 B.R. 1001 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989).
57 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6) (1999).
59 See Grogan v. Gardner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991). Although Section 523 is applicable in Chapter
7, 11, 12, and 13 cases, see 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1999), debts based on cash collateral misuse may
nevertheless be dischargeable in Chapter 12 and 13 cases. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a), 1328 (1999). In
addition, because cash collateral misuse in bankruptcy occurs subsequent to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, and a Chapter 7 case may only discharge pre-petition debts, see 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1999), cash
collateral misuse does not provide grounds for a Section 523 action in that same bankruptcy proceeding,
and instead only provides grounds for such an action where the misuse was in a prior bankruptcy
proceeding. See, e.g., Green River Production Credit Assoc. v. Alvey (In re Alvey), 56 B.R. 170 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1985). Furthermore, cash collateral misuse is unlikely to occur where a trustee controls estate
property. However, debts arising subsequent to the petition date but prior to the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization may be discharged in a Chapter 11 case. See II U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1999). Therefore, a
Section 523 action for cash collateral misuse will typically provide a remedy in a Chapter 11 case.
59 See Associates Fim. Serv. Co. v. Koran Enterprises, Inc. (In re Koran Enterprises, Inc.), 61 B.R.
321,326-27 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986). Although failure to segregate cash collateral funds as required by
Section 363(c)(4), without consent or court permission to use the funds, might also amount to conversion
(since a debtor would be wrongfully exercising control over the property of another-the creditor's security
interest-without consent of the owner or other authorization), it is unlikely that, under these facts, the
requisite intent can be shown, because a failure to segregate is more likely an act of omission than an act
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courts have uniformly defined conversion as "a wrongful exercise of dominion
by one person over property of another. It must be shown that the appropria-
tion of property was unauthorized and without consent of the owner.' 60
Despite this uniformity, a court should require a creditor to prove all elements
of conversion dictated by the appropriate state's law.
6'
In addition to proving the elements of conversion, the creditor must prove
both willfulness, 62 or the deliberate or intentional causing of injury,63 and
maliciousness, which may be established by a mere "finding of implied or
constructive malice,"' in which the conversion was committed "without just
cause or excuse." 6 Negligent or reckless disregard of one's duty does not
amount to willfulness.'
Alternatively, a secured creditor may seek relief from a debtor's misuse
of cash collateral pursuant to Section 523(a)(4)67 by proceeding under a theory
of embezzlement,68 defined as "the fraudulent appropriation of property by a
with the specific intent to injure. See Craig A. Sloane, The New "Intentional Tort" Standard Under
Section 523(a)(6), NORTON BANKR. L. ADV., June 1998, at 12.
60 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goycochea (In re Goycochea), 192 B.R. 847, 848 (Bankr. D. Md.
1996).
61 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 283 ("The validity of a creditor's claim is determined by rules of state
law").
62 Cases that discuss this issue use both the "willful" and "wilful" spellings. See Wolfson v.
Equine Capital Corp. (In re Wolfson), 56 F.3d 52, 54 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1995). For linguists, we note that
English lexicographers regard "willful" and "wilful" as acceptable variants. The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1465-466 (1976).
63 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998).
64 Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1263 (11 th Cir. 1988). Rebhan is the majority
view. The Eighth Circuit espouses the minority view. In the Eighth Circuit, to prove malice, a separate
showing of intentional harm, where the expected harm is substantially certain to occur, is required. See
Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1985). These
opinions should all be read in light of Kawaauhau.
65 Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Perry Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 783 F.2d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 1986).
66 See Kawaauhau, 118 S. Ct. at 978. One pre-Kawaauhau court opined that where a debtor sells
secured property, uses the proceeds, and fails to demonstrate that the use benefited the estate or served some
necessary purpose, then the debt should, under Section 523(a)(6), be held nondischargeable. See In re
Beasley, 62 B.R. 653, 655-56 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (finding that under the facts of the case, the debtor's
unauthorized use of cash collateral was willful and malicious as a matter of law under that three-part test.).
The holding in Beasley is probably questionable following the Supreme Court's decision is Kawaauhau.
67 Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge debt "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Since there is no technical trust involved with a cash
collateral violation, the fiduciary prong is not applicable. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
68 See Beasley, 62 B.R. at 654-55. The case of Green River Production Credit Assoc. v. Alvey (In
re Alvey), 56 B.R. 170 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985), held that the unauthorized use of cash collateral by a
Chapter 11 debtor is prima facie evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty for purposes of a Section 523(a)(4)
nondischargeability complaint for defalcation by a fiduciary in a later Chapter 7 proceeding. Id. at 173-74.
However, this is not good precedent. The concept of fiduciary under Section 523(a)(4) has been defined
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person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has
lawfully come,"'69 even where the debtor does not stand in a fiduciary capacity
to that creditor. 70  Embezzlement requires that the debtor "knowingly and
willfully misapplie[d] or convert[ed] the property.' '  By way of example, one
court found that debt resulting from a debtor's use of cash collateral without
the creditor's consent and without explanation amounted to embezzlement,
and held that debt to be nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(4).72
Despite a debt's exception from discharge, Section 523(a) lacks effective-
ness where a debtor has only a dim prospect of possessing assets subsequent
to the bankruptcy from which a creditor may collect. Finally, a Section 523(a)
action may only be brought against an "individual debtor," and not against a
corporation or partnership.
G. Tort Liability (Conversion)
In addition to providing a basis for a nondischargeability action pursuant
to Code Section 523(a), the remedy of conversion may also provide an
independent cause of action.74 By bringing an adversary proceeding alleging
narrowly as "applying only to technical or express trusts, and not those which the law implies from the
contract." See LSP Investment Partnership v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th Cir. 1993).
Thus, the fiduciary requirement in Section 523(aX4) does not apply where there is only a constructive trust,
see Beasley, 62 B.R. at 654, which appears to be the case in Alvey regarding the Chapter 11 debtor in
possession. Furthermore, the Alvey court relied on a case involving a Section 727 action for a complete
denial of discharge, and not on the specific provisions of Section 523(a)(4). Alvey, 56 B.R. at 173. This
is significant because the stricter requirement of an actual trust is different from the usual state law
definition of fiduciary. On the other hand, a fiduciary relationship does not have to exist for a creditor to
prevail on an embezzlement claim under Section 523(a)(4).
69 See Carlson v. Rigsby (In re Rigsby), 152 B.R. 776, 778 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
70 See id.
71 Id. at 779. The Rigsby court went on further to say that "[i]f the actions of the parties are more
in the nature of a debtor-creditor relationship," there is no embezzlement. Id. The court in Rigsby
specifically distinguished the facts before it from where the objecting party has a security interest in
proceeds of a sale. Id. at 778.
72 Beasley, 62 B.R. at 656. The court also found the debt to be nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(6) (as conduct effecting a conversion). Id.
73 See Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985).
Importantly, this only seems to matter in a case under Chapter 11 of the Code, because although a
corporation or partnership may liquidate under Chapter 7 of the Code, only an individual may be granted
a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1999); 4 CO jERON BANKRUFI'CY 523.02, at 523-14 to 523-16
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998). "Unlike in any other chapter, section 1228(a) makes the
section 523(a) exceptions to discharge applicable to corporate and partnership debtors as well as individual
debtors." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 523.02, at 523-15 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev.
1998). Chapter 13 is only available to individuals. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1999).
74 See Associates Frn. Serv. Co. of Texas v. Koran Enterprises, Inc. (In re Koran Enterprises, Inc.),
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conversion, a creditor may recover the "converted" property and obtain
monetary damages.75
As cash collateral must be segregated,76 it "represents a special fund as the
traceable proceeds of the intangible chattels."'7' Therefore, despite money's
fungible nature, cash collateral's unauthorized use may amount to
conversion.7' To be successful, a conversion action in bankruptcy court must
fulfill all elements of conversion required by the appropriate state's law.79
In addition to a debtor, any participants in the conversion including, where
appropriate, a debtor's attorney and a corporate debtor's officers, directors,
and shareholders, may be held liable for damages following from the
conversion.' ° All participants in a conversion are jointly and severally liable
for ensuing damages.81
The traditional remedy for conversion-recovery of damages-may not
be appropriate against a debtor in bankruptcy due to the harm which would be
caused to unsecured creditors.' As personal liability may be imposed against
the debtor's officers, directors, shareholders, or attorneys for their conduct,
8 3
the conversion remedy is especially valuable where an impecunious corporate
debtor's principals may be held liable. Where a creditor recovers damages
from a debtor's officers, directors, shareholders, or attorneys, direct detriment
to the debtor is avoided, and those assets available for distribution to other
61 B.R. 321 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); Hassett v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re CIS Corp.), 172 B.R. 748
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
7 As cash collateral is property of the estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1999), an action alleging that
its post-petition use amounts to conversion falls within a bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction. See Koran,
61 B.R. 321, 325-26 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) ("The prohibited use of cash collateral amount[s] to post-
bankruptcy conversion of estate property which has historically been remedied by the bankruptcy court's
summary power of turnover."). But see Hassett v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re CIS Corp.), 172 B.R. 748,
758 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (distinguishing the Koran case as having core jurisdiction due to the debtor's use of
cash collateral, which is explicitly governed by II U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), and rejecting the proposition that
post-petition conversion of property of the estate is sufficient to grant a conversion action core status).
76 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(4) (1999).
77 Koran, 61 B.R. at 327.
78 Id.; see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. This may appear odd because conversion
usually concerns goods; however, cash collateral is unique and, according to the Bankruptcy Code, must
be segregated from other funds. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(4) (1999).
One might argue that a security interest cannot be converted, at least where that security interest
is not destroyed, but instead follows the funds' disposition or can be traced. However, even in that case,
liability arguably exists on the ground that such disposition is nevertheless a wrongful use.
79 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
so Koran, 61 B.R. at 327.
S1 Id.
92 See discussion supra Part (IV)(A). In this context, assessing punitive damages against a debtor
is particularly inappropriate, as the funds used to pay those damages might be distributed to other creditors.
83 See Koran, 61 B.R. at 327-28.
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creditors will not be depleted. Finally, proceeding against those causing the
conversion not only serves to restitute the creditor, but also directly punishes
those responsible for the injury.
H. Civil Contempt of Court
As a remedy for violations within bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy
court may sanction an offending party for contempt.84 The source of a
bankruptcy court's sanction and contempt power is, however, unsettled. Most
courts find that this power is derived from Section 105(a). 5 However, courts
have also held that contempt power stems from Bankruptcy Rule 9020, which
dictates procedural requirements for adjudicating determinations of contempt
committed in, or outside, the presence of a bankruptcy judge. 6 In addition,
courts may sanction parties for violations of Bankruptcy Rule 9011, which
governs representations to the court.8 7
Also unsettled is the scope of a bankruptcy court's power to sanction, and
to hold in contempt, parties, their principals, and their counsel. Civil
contempt of court is intended "to coerce compliance with a court order or to
4 See Placid Refining Co. v. Terrebone Fuel and Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebone Fuel and Lube, Inc.),
108 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 1997); Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1996); Eck
v. Dodge Chemical Co. (In re Power Recovery Systems, Inc.), 950 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1991); Burd v.
Walters (In re Waters), 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985); In
re Etch-Art, Inc., 48 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985); Centerre Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Continental Marine
Corp. (In re Continental Marine Corp.), 35 B.R. 990 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); see generally Laura B.
Bartell, Contempt of the Bankruptcy Court-a New Look, 1996 U. ILL. L REV. 1 (1996).
35 See Terrebone, 108 F.3d at 613; Hardy, 97 F.3d at 1389; Mountain America Credit Union v.
Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1990); Walters, 868 F.2d at 669.
" See Power Recovery Systems, 950 F.2d at 802; see also Skinner, 917 F.2d at 449 (bolstering
its argument that it is constitutional for bankruptcy courts to exercise civil contempt power by stating that
such an order is subject to de novo review by a district court under Bankruptcy Rule 9020).
The source of this power is of significance. Under Bankruptcy Rule 9020, a district court
reviews a bankruptcy court's contempt order under the de novo standard, as opposed to the traditional abuse
of discretion standard which such orders would normally be subject to on appeal.
8 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (c) (1999); see Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow
Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 282-83 (9th Cir. 1996) (sanctions against principal of corporate debtor);
Midwest Properties No. Two v. Big Hill Investment Co., 93 B.R. 357, 361-63 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (sanctions
against debtor's president and attorney).
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 (c) governs the imposition of sanctions for violations of Bankruptcy Rule
9011 (b) (concerning representations to the court), and states, in pertinent part, "[i]f, after notice and a
reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or
parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation." For a further discussion of
a bankruptcy court's power to sanction parties for Rule 9011 violations, see infra note 93.
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compensate another party for the contemnor's violation."8  Therefore,
sanctions for civil contempt are "purely remedial."89 Although certain courts
have ordered offending parties to pay monetary sanctions,90 such relief is
arguably improper as a remedy for cash collateral violations.9 A bankruptcy
court certainly lacks authority to assess punitive damages for civil contempt.'
Even if bankruptcy courts' power to sanction or hold parties in contempt
for violations of the Bankruptcy Code rests on unsure footing, these courts
surely possess such power with regard to violations of their own court orders.
Therefore, as a prerequisite to invoking sanctions for contempt, the entry of
a Section 363(e) order prohibiting or conditioning the use of cash collateral,
as discussed in Part IV(L) of this Article, or an order enjoining a party from
further violations, as discussed in Part IV(E) of this Article, should be
considered.93
N In re Terrebone Fuel and Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d at 612.
89 See In re Power Recovery Systems, Inc., 950 F.2d at 802. An example of a remedial sanction
is incarceration to compel compliance. See In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985) (indefinitely
imprisoning the debtor until he returned the cash collateral he removed from a segregated account, and
jailing the debtor's attorney until he advised his client that, by law, he may not refuse to obey the court's
order, but may only seek an appeal of such order).
90 See Terrebone, 108 F.3d at 612 (costs and fees of debtor to defend action to collect discharged
debt); Power Recovery Systems, 950 F.2d at 801 (rental costs for failure to remove heavy equipment from
property); Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989) (costs and fees of debtor to
enforce rights, but not emotional distress).
91 Under principles of statutory construction, it is not clear that monetary sanctions are appropriate.
Section 362(h) allows an individual to recover actual and punitive damages for injuries caused by willful
violations of the automatic stay. However, Section 363, which provides for the use of cash collateral, does
not provide for the award of damages. These differences between closely-related sections could be
interpreted as Congressional intent to preclude damage awards for violations of Section 363. In addition,
there are good reasons to distinguish between the remedies allowed for violations of these two sections.
While an award of damages against a debtor for cash collateral misuse would harm the debtor's ability to
reorganize and lessen the funds available to pay unsecured creditors, an adversary proceeding seeking
damages for willful violation of the automatic stay is an action against a creditor, and, therefore, does not
harm the debtor or other creditors.
92 See Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384,1389 (11 th Cir. 1996). By definition,
punitive damages punish the contemnor, and thus are not remedial.
93 See In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985) (holding a debtor and his attorney in civil
contempt for disobeying the court's order to return misappropriated cash collateral); Centerre Bank Nat'l
Assoc. v. Continental Marine Corp. (In re Continental Marine Corp.), 35 B.R. 990,992 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1984) (violation of statutory cash collateral provisions, absent any non-compliance with a court order, was
insufficient to hold the debtor in contempt). Some courts require a showing of w;llful contempt. See In
re Etch-Art, Inc., 48 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) (refusing to find the debtor and its principal in
contempt where there was not sufficient proof that the unauthorized use of cash collateral, in violation of
statute, court order, and agreement of the parties, was willful).
At least one court has suggested that a Rule 9011 violation is a violation of a court order by
virtue of the fact that the Bankruptcy Rules were issued by the United States Supreme Court. See In re
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Although violation of a court order may provide sufficient justification for
that court's award of monetary sanctions, the propriety of issuing monetary
sanctions against a debtor should be carefully considered because of its effect
on other creditors. As with earlier discussed remedies, however, sanctioning
a corporate debtor's responsible parties, such as its officers, directors,
shareholders, and counsel, may achieve a suitable outcome-vindicating the
harmed creditor's interest, while preserving the estate for the benefit of the
debtor's remaining creditors.94
A bankruptcy court's contempt order is subject to a district court's de
novo review,95 and is therefore not of a binding nature.
L Criminal Contempt of Court
In contrast to civil contempt, criminal contempt of court9 6 is treated no
differently than any other criminal proceeding-and is, among other things,
aimed at punishing a contemnor.97  Although it is well-established that
bankruptcy courts have, at least to an extent, the power to sanction and hold
parties in civil contempt, 98 it is uncertain whether that power extends to
criminal contempt. 99 As discussed in Part IV(H) of this Article, if bankruptcy
Hunter, 190 B.R. 118, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Colo. 1995). This authority bolsters the argument that violation
of a cash collateral order may subject a debtor to contempt sanctions.
9 This protects all creditors and imposes the sanctions upon the parties who actually committed
the wrongdoing. See Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 282-
83 (9th Cir. 1996) (sanctions against principal of corporate debtor); Midwest Properties No. Two v. Big
Hill Investment Co., 93 B.R. 357, 361-63 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (sanctions against debtor's president and
attorney); Krisle, 54 B.R. at 330 (holding a debtor and his attorney in civil contempt for disobeying the
court's order to return wrongfully misappropriated cash collateral); see also discussion supra Part IV(G).
95 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(c), 9033 (1999); In re Carrico, 214 B.R. 842 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997)
(contested contempt order is not a final order); see also supra note 86.
9 See Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174 (8th Cir. 1993); Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp),
895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990); see also In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (assessing
punitive damages against a creditor that violated the discharge injunction); see generally Laura B. Bartell,
Contempt of the Bankruptcy Court-a New Look, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1996).
97 See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 302 (1947); Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp), 895 F.2d 1503, 1509 (5th Cir. 1990).
98 See Placid Refining Co. v. Terrebone Fuel and Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d 609, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1997);
Hardy, 97 F.3d at 1389; In re Ragar, 3 F.3d 1174, 1178-79; Power Recovery Systems, 950 F.2d at 802;
Mountain America Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1990); Burd v.
Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989); Part IV(H) of this Article. But see In re Elias,
98 B.R. 332, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (collecting cases).
9 See Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1511 ("[B]ankruptcy courts do not have inherent criminal contempt
powers, at least with respect to criminal contempts not committed in (or near) their presence."); Ragar, 3
F.3d at 1177-78 (bankruptcy court was, in effect, only making proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law in a non-core proceeding when it held attorney in criminal contempt, where such order was only
262 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:243
courts do not have the power to hold a party in criminal contempt, punitive
damages, which are a remedy incident to criminal contempt, are outside the
scope of available remedies.
The standard required to hold a party in criminal contempt is more
stringent than that required for civil contempt. While civil contempt merely
requires clear and convincing evidence that a court order was violated,
criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt."o°
J. Appointment of an Examiner
Appointment of an examiner is a less severe remedy than appointment of
a trustee, discussed in the next section of this Article. Where a trustee is not
appropriate, a creditor may seek appointment of an examiner °" to investigate
"any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanage-
ment, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by
current or former management of the debtor."'"'° An examiner's appointment
may be of particular use where a secured creditor believes that a debtor is
misusing cash collateral, but the creditor has insufficient proof of the
suspected wrongdoing.
K. Appointment of a Trustee
Cash collateral misuse may amount to "cause"10' 3 sufficient to justify the
appointment of a trustee" in a Chapter 11 case. 5 Therefore, a secured
creditor may seek appointment of a trustee to replace a debtor in possession
effective if the contemnor did not object within ten days and the order was subject to de novo review by
the district court if there was an objection).
1'0 See Jove Engineering, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 92 F.3d 1539, 1545-46 (11 th Cir. 1996).
101 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1999). Section 1104 requires that "such appointment is in the interests
of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate," 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (1999),
or that "the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or
owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000." 11 U.S.C. § 104(c)(2) (1999). For the procedural requirements
for this remedy, see Section 1104 of the Code and Bankruptcy Rules 9014 and 9034.
102 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1999). For the procedural requirements of this remedy, see Part IV(K) of
this Article.
103 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1999).
104 See id.
103 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4
B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). This remedy is only available in a Chapter 11 case because, in all other
applicable chapters, a trustee is appointed at the commencement of the case (remember that Section 363
is not applicable in Chapter 9, see discussion supra note 8). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 703, 1104, 1163,
1202, 1302 (1999). For the procedural requirements for this remedy, see Section 1104 of the Code and
Bankruptcy Rules 2007.1(a), 9014, and 9034(g).
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from controlling estate property" ° and operating the debtor's business. 
°7
Once Section 1104(a) "cause" exists, a court lacks discretion and must appoint
a trustee.108
Appointment of a trustee protects a bankruptcy estate from the actions of
a debtor in possession which is "spending" a lienholder's collateral for its own
gain, to that creditor's detriment. Other than taking control of the business
away from the debtor, there is no punitive or restitutionary aspect to this
measure.
The inefficiency of this remedy may be problematic. Appointment of a
trustee carries with it a concomitant cost to the bankruptcy estate."° As this
cost will be borne by the debtor's creditors, and may even hinder a successful
reorganization, appointment of a trustee may not be an ideal remedy."n In
addition, a trustee may not possess the ability to operate a debtor's business as
productively as would the debtor in possession itself. Thus, a bankruptcy
court should analyze whether appointing a trustee is merited in light of the
costs and benefits to the estate and creditors.' Finally, as appointment of a
trustee does not replace improperly used cash collateral, other remedies may
prove more effective. Appointment, however, may be beneficial where a
debtor's conduct exceeds tolerable limits.
Importantly, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recom-
mended the amendment of Section 1104 to include the unauthorized use of
cash collateral as an explicit ground for the appointment of a Chapter 11
trustee.'12
106 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(2), 1106(a)(1) (1999).
107 See 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1999).
JO As with tift-stay motions under Section 362(d), but unlike motions to convert or dismiss under
Section 1112(b), Section 1104(a) uses mandatory ("shall") rather than permissive ("may") language. See
II U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 1104(a), 1112(b) (1999); Oklahoma Refining Co. v. Blaik (In re Oklahoma Refining
Co.), 838 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1988).
109 After approval by a bankruptcy court following notice and a hearing, see 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)
(1999); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(6), a Chapter 11 trustee's fee is entitled to a priority as an administrative
expense. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(1), 503(b)(2), 507(a)(1) (1999). A court may not award a fee that
exceeds the limits set in Code Section 326(a). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 326(a), 330(a)(1) (1999).
"' See Anchorage Boat Sales, 4 B.R. at 644 ("The appointment of a trustee in a Chapter I I case
is an extraordinary remedy, and one which nay impose a substantial financial burden on a... debtor").
I See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1999).
112 See discussion supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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L. Order Conditioning or Denying Future Use
A creditor may seek an order from a bankruptcy court prohibiting a debtor
from obtaining authority to use cash collateral.1 3 In Oxford Royal Mushroom
Products, Inc.,114 the debtor in possession entered into a cash collateral
stipulation, and an extension of that stipulation, both of which the bankruptcy
court approved. The stipulation stated, in part, that upon breach of the
agreement, the bankruptcy court "shall enter an order terminating further use
of cash collateral." ''1 When the debtor later breached the agreement, the court
rescinded its approval under Section 363(c)(2)(B)" 6 and terminated the
debtor's right to seek authority to use cash collateral in the future." 7
Despite the bankruptcy court's holding in Oxford Royal Mushroom
Products, Inc., nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules
supports the entry of an order barring a debtor in possession from seeking
court permission to use cash collateral. A court's prospective declaration that
such a violation precludes any favorable future ruling seems harsh. However,
a debtor's violation of a court-approved stipulation is an important factor that
a court should consider when hearing a motion for approval of cash collateral
use.
Finally, while such an order serves a punitive function, it does not allow
an injured party any recompense.
M. Denial of Confirmation
Generally, a debtor in a Chapter 11 case seeks to obtain confirmation of
a plan of reorganization."' Through confirmation, the debtor regains rights
in all property of the estate, generally free and clear of all claims, interests,
and liens, except as provided for by the reorganization plan." 9 More
importantly, confirmation entitles the debtor to a discharge of all discharge-
able pre-confirmation debts, subject to certain exceptions (such as where the
plan liquidates that debtor or where the debtor waives a discharge).2
113 See In re Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 19 B.R. 974, 975 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
14 19 B.R. 974 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
15 Oxford, 19 B.R. at 975 n.3.
116 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B) (1999).
117 See Oxford, 19 B.R. at 975.
11 Unless the court orders otherwise, a debtor in possession has the exclusive right to file a plan
during the first 120 days after filing a Chapter 11 petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1999). After the
expiration of that time period, other interested parties may also file plans for consideration. See id. The
debtor is bound by the terms of a confirmed plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1999).
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b)-(c) (1999).
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1999).
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The Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court shall confirm a
plan only where certain requirements are met.' One of those requirements,
found in Section 1129(a)(2), is that "[tihe proponent of the plan complies with
the applicable provisions of' the Bankruptcy Code.' As Chapter 3 of the
Bankruptcy Code2 3 applies to a Chapter 11 case,'24 bankruptcy courts have
denied confirmation of the debtor's proposed plan where that debtor has
misused cash collateral in violation of Code Section 363(c)(2).'25
Any party in interest may file an objection to the confirmation of a plan
of reorganization.'26 That objection gives rise to a contested matter under
Bankruptcy Rule 9014,'27 and must be served on the debtor, the trustee (if one
exists), official committees, the United States Trustee, and any other parties
required by the court.2 ' Additionally, even in the absence of objection, a
creditor, without stating its reasons, may vote against a proposed plan of
reorganization.
29
Because a debtor may seek approval of an alternate plan of reorganization,
denial of confirmation is not as severe a remedy as denial of discharge,
discussed next in this Article. However, the cause for denial may provide a
barrier to confirmation of any future plan. Certainly, an injured creditor will
possess additional bargaining leverage as a result of achieving denial of a
plan's confirmation. Finally, denial of confirmation serves a punitive function,
but does not offer any restitutionary effect.
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1999).
'2 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2) (1999).
123 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-366 (1999).
124 See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1999).
12S See Cothran v. United States (In re Cothran), 45 B.R. 836, 838 (S.D. Ga. 1984). But see In re
The Landing Assoc., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 810-11 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (confirming debtor's Chapter
11 plan where earlier cash collateral violations had been remedied).
126 See 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b) (1999).
127 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 (1999).
128 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(f), 3020(b)(1) (1999).
l29 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1999).
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N. Denial of Discharge
By filing an adversary complaint 3° within a certain period of time,' in
limited circumstances,'32 a creditor may seek to deny a debtor a discharge of
his or her debts' based upon cash collateral misuse. This remedy may be
accomplished by proceeding under Section 727(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code,'34 which requires the party objecting to discharge 3 5 to prove the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 36 (1) a transfer of
property; (2) that transfer involved property of the bankruptcy estate; (3) that
transfer occurred after the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (4) at the time
of that transfer, the debtor had an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor.17 To keep with the policy of providing a debtor with a "fresh start,"
130 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(4) (1999).
131 A complaint objecting to discharge pursuant to Section 727(a) must be filed within sixty days
of the Section 341 meeting of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (1999); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a) (1999).
An objection to discharge under Section 1141(d)(3) must be filed by the first confirmation hearing. See
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a) (1999). These time periods may be extended by the court. See FED. R. BANKR.
P. 4004(b) (1999) ("On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice, the court may extend for
cause the time for filing a complaint objecting to discharge. The motion shall be made before such time has
expired.").
132 This remedy is only available where the debtor is an individual, see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)
(1999), and where the debtor is liquidating under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727, 1141(d)(3) (1999).
133 The adversary complaint objecting to discharge must be served upon the United States Trustee,
in addition to other required parties. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 90340) (1999).
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX2)(B) (1999) ('Te court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless.., the
debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody
of property under [the Bankruptcy Code], has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or
has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed... property of the estate, after
the date of the filing of the petition ....). Section 1141(d)(3)(C) makes Section 727(a) applicable in Chapter
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(C) (1999).
135 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4005 (1999).
13 See Barclays/American Business Credit, Inc. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389, 394 (6th
Cir. 1994); Farouki v. Emirates Bank Int'l, 14 F.3d 244, 250 n.17 (4th Cir. 1994); Beaubouef v. Beaubouef
(In re Beaubouef), 966 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1992); First Nat'l Bank of Gordon v. Serafini (In re
Serafini), 938 F.2d 1156, 1157 (10th Cit. 1991).
13 See United States v. Ayala (In re Ayala), 107 B.R. 271, 274 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989). Since
unauthorized use of cash collateral in this context will always involve a transfer of property made after the
date of filing the bankruptcy petition, elements one and three will always be satisfied. In addition, as a
debtor's cash collateral is property of that debtor's bankruptcy estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1999)
(defining property of the estate as "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case."); In re Koran Enterprises, Inc., 61 B.R. 321, 326 n.14 (quoting
Brown v. Dellinger (In re Brown), 22 B.R. 844, 849-50 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982)) (legal title is sufficient
to bring property into the bankruptcy estate, even where the debtor has no equity in the property);
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courts should liberally construe Section 727 in favor of debtors.1
38
To deny a debtor a discharge, a creditor must prove the debtor's actual
intent to defraud, hinder, or delay creditors, and not merely constructive
fraudulent intent.'" Since direct evidence of actual fraudulent intent is rarely
available, fraudulent intent may be shown with circumstantial evidence, or
may be inferred from the debtor's actions."
Where a creditor proves the requisite fraudulent intent, a court should find
that a debtor who has wrongfully used cash collateral is not entitled to a
-bankruptcy discharge. 4' For example, in Devers v. Bank of Sheridan (In re
Devers) 42 the debtors, subsequent to the date of their bankruptcy petition, had
been selling secured property and commingling the proceeds with their
ordinary accounts. Upon learning of this, the bankruptcy court ordered the
debtors to notify it of any additional sales of secured property and to segregate
the proceeds of the sale. After the debtors converted their cases from Chapter
11 to Chapter 7, the secured creditor discovered that additional property had
been sold, and that those proceeds were not properly segregated, in violation
of the court's order. As a result, the secured creditor successfully obtained the
court's order denying the debtors' discharge pursuant to Section
727(a)(2)(B).' 43 Stating that "a debtor in possession has the duty to protect
and conserve property in his possession for the benefit of creditors,"' 44 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found, on appeal, the
debtors' failure to obey the bankruptcy court's order to be evidence of
fraudulent intent, and affirmed the denial of the debtors' discharge.'45 While
discussion supra notes 1, 3, the second element will be satisfied. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1999) (defining
cash collateral to include "proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property ...," whether acquired
before or after the commencement of the bankruptcy case.).
138 See Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996); Rosen v. Bezner,
996 F.2d 1527, 1534 (3d Cir. 1993).
139 See In re Krehl, 86 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1996); Devers v. Bank of Sheridan (In re Devers),
759 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1985).
140 See Krehl, 86 F.3d at 743; Devers, 759 F.2d at 753-54.
141 See Barclays/American Business Credit, Inc. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389 (6th Cir.
1994) (denying discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), (B) for, inter alia, using and transferring
postpetition cash collateral without authorization). The size of the sum of money wrongfully used is
"immaterial except for the single purpose of tending to negate the [element of] fraudulent intent." United
States v. Ayala (In re Ayala), 107 B.R. 271, 275 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989).
142 759 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1985).
143 See In re Devers, 759 F.2d at 752-53.
I" Id. at 754. Therefore, according to that court of appeals, although property is subject to a
security interest, it remains property of the estate for purposes of Section 727(a)(2)(B). See Ayala, 107 B.R.
at 276 (discussing Devers).
145 See id. at 754-55. Because the debtors did not satisfactorily explain the "disappearance" of a
tractor in which the secured creditor had an interest, the court of appeals also found grounds for denial of
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other courts have held that a debtor's conversion of secured property does not
amount to cause sufficient to deny that debtor's discharge, 146 those cases are
distinguishable. 1
47
Denying a debtor's discharge may serve both restitutionary and punitive
functions. However, as with an action to except debt from discharge,
collecting debt in the future may prove impossible, rendering any restitution
meaningless. Nevertheless, denial of discharge is a powerful remedy, and the
potential for its implementation accordingly provides some utility.
0. Relieffrom Stay
According to Section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 148 "lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of" a party in interest provides
"cause" sufficient to justify that party's relief from the automatic stay of
litigation imposed upon creditors in bankruptcy. 49 Therefore, upon notice and
a hearing,t"° a creditor may seek a bankruptcy court's permission to foreclose
discharge under Section 727(a)(5). See id. at 754. Additionally, the violation of the bankruptcy court's
order provided reason for denial pursuant to Section 727(a)(6). See id. at 755.
14 See Peoples State Bank of Mazzepa, Minn. v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 B.R. 697,
705 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); First Nat'l Bank v. Holtz (In re Holtz), 62 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1986); Keller Farms v. Ellefson (In re Ellefson), 54 B.R. 16, 17 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
147 Those cases, which undertake the analysis under Code Section 727(a)(2)(A), are based on the
reasoning that where a debtor has no equity in property, that property cannot be considered "property of
the debtor." See Drenckhahn, 77 B.R. at 705; Ellefson, 54 B.R. at 17. These holdings are not relevant to
Section 727(a)(2)(B), which requires a transfer of "property of the estate" and not "property of the debtor."
Furthermore, there exists a split in authority on this issue, with more recent cases holding that a lack of
equity, in and of itself, should not preclude the denial of a debtor's discharge under Section 727(a)(2)(A).
See Aweida v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 150 B.R. 462, 467 (D. Colo. 1993); Future Time, Inc. v. Yates, 26
B.R,. 1006, 1009 (M.D. Ga. 1983), affid, 712 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1983); American Gen. Fin., Inc. v.
Burnside (In re Burnside), 209 B.R. 867, 871-72 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997). In Barclays/American Business
Credit, Inc. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit did not allow the debtors a discharge, under Section 727(a)(2), because the debtors
transferred encumbered accounts receivable and used cash collateral without authorization in order to
hinder or delay creditors. As recognized in Burnside, "[u]nderlying this holding was the notion that the
debtors['] conversion of the secured creditor's collateral could constitute a violation of § 727(a)(2)(A)."
Burnside, 209 B.R. at 872.
148 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1999).
149 See In re La Fayette Dial, Inc., 92 B.R. 798, 800-02 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); In re O.P. Held,
Inc., 74 B.R. 777, 781-84 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330, 342 & n.8 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1985); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 B.R. 635,
641-44 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). For a discussion of "adequate protection," see supra note 18.
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1999). As with a Section 363(e) motion, a motion for relief from the
automatic stay must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a). See
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a) (1999). For a discussion of the strictures of Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a), see
discussion supra note 18.
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on the creditor's lien on cash collateral by demonstrating that a debtor's cash
collateral misuse has engendered inadequate protection of the creditor's
security interest. Upon such a motion, and in the absence of the debtor's
demonstration that the creditor is adequately protected, t"' relief is
mandatory.152
While relief from the automatic stay allows a creditor to proceed with
state law foreclosure remedies while the debtor remains in bankruptcy, that
debtor's prospect for reorganization may be damaged without use of the cash
collateral. As a result, relief from the stay provides a potentially severe
remedy for cash collateral misuse.
P. Dismissal
Pursuant to Section 1112(b)153 of the Bankruptcy Code and on notice and
a hearing,'54 a creditor may seek dismissal of a debtor's Chapter 11 case for
proper "cause," including those reasons listed in Section 1112(b).'55 As the
statutory list is not exhaustive, 56 bankruptcy courts should consider other
appropriate factors, including cash collateral misuse.157 Dismissal of a
bankruptcy case generally restores parties to the same position they were in
151 The burden of proving adequate protection in a Section 362(d) hearing is on the debtor. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) (1999).
152 The court then possesses no discretion regarding lifting the stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1999)
("[Tlhe court shall grant relief from the stay .....
153 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1999).
154 See id. A motion to dismiss is governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014 and must be served on the
United States Trustee, in addition to other required parties. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9034(c) (1999).
155 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1999).
156 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 405-06 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 117-18 (1978).
157 See In re Wells, 71 B.R. 554, 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); see also Cothran v. United States
(In re Cothran), 45 B.R. 836 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (case dismissed after confirmation denied twice for, inter alia,
using cash collateral in violation of Section 362(c)(2)). But see In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791,
811 n.33 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (Section 1112(b) "does not call for dismissal of the case for violations
of cash collateral orders.").
In Landing Associates, Ltd., the bankruptcy court reasoned that Congress provided specific
examples of "cause" in Section 11 12(b), and that the absence of cash collateral violations in that list leads
to the conclusion that dismissal is not a proper remedy for a cash collateral violation. That argument is
misplaced, however, because the Section 1112(b) list was not meant to be exclusive. See supra note 156
and accompanying text. In addition, the Landing court cited as examples of cause for dismissal failure to
file a plan within the time frame prescribed by the court and failure to pay required fees. See Landing, 157
B.R. at 811 n.33. While these are certainly significant violations, they are not as harmful to creditors as
cash collateral misuse, and are more appropriately viewed as disrespectful to the court and its procedural
necessities. Congress's inclusion of those remedies exhibits its broad strokes in demonstrating the wide
scope of behavior which may subject a debtor to dismissal. Finally, Landing merely involved confirmation
of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, and the issue of dismissal was not before the court.
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prior to the case's commencement,158 and allows all creditors to immediately
pursue state law remedies. 59
Indeed, the United States Congress is considering an amendment to
Section 1112(b), as proposed by the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion, that would list unauthorized use of cash collateral as an explicit ground
for dismissal."6
Dismissal is an extremely severe punitive remedy, but may be appropriate
where a debtor deprives a secured creditor of valuable collateral in contraven-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code.
Q. Conversion to Chapter 7
As an alternative to dismissal under Section 1112(b) 1 ' of the Bankruptcy
Code, via that same subsection, a creditor may seek to convert a debtor's
Chapter 11 reorganization case to a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code."
While the procedural requirements and the necessity of demonstrating "cause"
are identical to the dismissal remedy,'63 the choice between these two
alternative remedies should be determined based upon "whichever is in the
best interest of creditors and the estate."' 64
Upon conversion to Chapter 7, a trustee will be appointed to liquidate the
property of the bankruptcy estate.165 Therefore, conversion provides one of the
most severe remedies for cash collateral misuse.
While the installation of a trustee may benefit creditors, a trustee does
carry a concomitant cost to the bankruptcy estate."6 Additionally, conversion
engenders delay in pursuing state court remedies that could be avoided with
dismissal. 167
As with dismissal, the United States Congress is considering an amend-
ment to Section 1112(b), as proposed by the National Bankruptcy Review
158 See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (1999).
159 See generally 7 COWJER ON BANKRUVrCY 11112.09, at 1112-78 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds.,
15th ed. rev. 1998).
160 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
161 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1999).
162 See In re Hewett, 32 B.R. 605, 606-07 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (finding debtor's use of cash
collateral, in violation of Section 363(c)(2), to support conversion).
163 See Part IV(P) of this Article.
164 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1999).
165 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(a), 701(a), 704 (1999). Accordingly, a debtor in possession loses control
of its business upon conversion. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(e) (1999).
166 See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (1999); see generally Part V(K) of this Article (discussing trustee costs
in Chapter 11 proceedings).
167 See Part IV(P) of this Article.
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Commission, that would list unauthorized use of cash collateral as an explicit
ground for conversion.168
R. Criminal Prosecution
Although not truly a creditor's remedy,169 the fraudulent misappropriation
of cash collateral may amount to criminal activity under Section 153 of Title
18 of the United States Code,17 prosecutable in a United States district
court.171 While this remedy will certainly punish a debtor, and will have a
deterrent effect on other debtors, a secured creditor will gain little benefit, as
imprisonment provides no remedial effect, and may indeed cause the debtor's
limited property to be further dissipated where liquidation results.
V. CONCLUSION
The inconsistency with which courts have remedied cash collateral misuse
has engendered uncertainty and a lack of uniformity. Although a court's
ability to fashion relief without constraint and individually tailor remedies on
a case-by-case basis may appear to achieve more equitable results, the need
for predictability and equality of result counsels strongly in favor of statutory
guidance.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has proposed an amend-
ment to the Bankruptcy Code which prescribes explicit remedies for cash
collateral misuse. Following the Commission's lead, Congress should
articulate clear instruction, such that a judge faced with cash collateral misuse
need not "innovate at pleasure," portraying "a knight-errant, roaming at will
168 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 3057(b) (1999) (describing duties of United States Attorney regarding
bankruptcy crimes). However, "creditors who assist in the prosecution 'of a criminal offense relating to the
[debtor's] case or to the business or property of the debtor' may apply for reimbursement of their 'actual
[and] necessary expenses' as a third priority expense of administration." I COLLIER ON BANKRuPrCY 1
7.10[1], at 7-183 (Lawrence P. King et al. ds., 15th ed. rev. 1998) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(C)
(1999)) (alterations in original).
170 Section 153, which applies to a debtor in possession because the debtor in possession stands in
the shoes of a bankruptcy trustee, see II U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1999), states, in pertinent part:
A person... who knowingly and fraudulently appropriates to the person's own use, embezzles,
spends, or transfers any property or secretes or destroys any document belonging to the estate
of the debtor shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1999).
171 For a general discussion of this remedy, see I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T1 7.03, 7.10
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1998); Mary Jo Heston, The United States Trustee: The Missing
Link of Bankruptcy Crime Prosecutions, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 359 (1998).
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in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.... yield[ing] to spasmodic
sentiment ... 172
172 BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
